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ABSTRACT

It is often unclear when a prior occurrence or disclosure of a claimed invention falls under
the patent law doctrines of inherent or accidental anticipation. Courts have applied
various tests in determining whether anticipation is inherent or accidental, and the cases
are difficult to reconcile. Tests seemingly dispositive to establish an accident in one case
may also appear dispositive to establish inherency. As a result of our analysis, we have
developed a two-step test that can be used to reconcile the two doctrines and determine
whether a product or process anticipates. The first prong is concerned with whether the
prior process or composition was useful in the art. If the answer to the first prong is no,
then the anticipation is accidental; if the answer is yes, the second prong is whether the
process or composition occurred under unusual conditions or occasionally. If the answer
to the second prong is no, then the anticipation is inherent; if the answer is yes, then the
anticipation is accidental. This test helps resolve the confusion about inherent and
accidental anticipation while remaining consistent with Supreme Court, Federal Circuit
and CCPA decisions.
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THE ACCIDENTAL AND INHERENT ANTICIPATION DOCTRINES:
WHERE Do WE STAND AND WHERE ARE WE GOING?
ANNE BROWN, PH.D.,* AND MARK POLYAKOV**

INTRODUCTION

It is well-known in patent law that a prior reference can defeat patentability
under 35 U.S.C. § 102 by expressly disclosing all of the elements of a claimed
invention. It is also well-known that a prior reference can defeat patentability under
the statute without having to expressly disclose all of the elements in the claim.' The
elements may simply inhere in a disclosed composition or process. This latter type of
reference is said to anticipate the claimed invention under the doctrine of "inherent
2
anticipation."
The prior occurrence of a process or composition can anticipate a claim under
this doctrine because of elements that simply inhere in the process or composition
even if these elements were not recognized at the time of the prior occurrence.
Inherent elements include components or properties of a composition and steps,
mechanisms of action, or results of a process. To establish a case of inherent
anticipation, the process or composition or element thereof must have existed or
3
occurred to a certainty (i.e., not possibility or probability).
There have been instances, however, in which a prior process or composition
inherently met all of the limitations of a claim, but where a court decided that the
doctrine of inherent anticipation did not apply (i.e., the claim was not anticipated).
In these cases, the courts have rationalized the prior art as "accidental." This has
come to be known among patent practitioners as the doctrine of "accidental
anticipation." "Accidental anticipation" is somewhat of a misnomer because under
this doctrine the prior art does not, in fact, anticipate under 35 U.S.C.§ 102.
As demonstrated by the recent Federal Circuit cases Schering Corp. v. Geneva
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.4 and Elan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Mayo Foundation for
Medical Education and Research,5 it is often unclear when an inherent prior
occurrence or disclosure falls under the doctrines of inherent anticipation or
accidental anticipation. Courts have not clearly defined what constitutes "accident."
Instead, courts seem to have relied on specific factual criteria. Additionally, courts
have applied various tests in determining whether anticipation is inherent or

* Ms. Anne Brown is the Senior Director of Intellectual Property at Athersys, Inc., in
Cleveland, Ohio.
**Mr. Mark Polyakov is a Patent Agent at Athersys, Inc., and received his Juris Doctor from
Case Western Reserve University School of Law in 2004.
1 See Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("A claim is
anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or
inherently described, in a single prior art reference.").
2 VerdegaalBrothers,814 F.2d at 631.
3 Scaltech, Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, LLC., 178 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
5 346 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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accidental, and the cases are difficult to reconcile. Tests seemingly dispositive to
establish an accident in one case may also appear dispositive to establish inherency.
In this paper, we propose a way to decide which of the two doctrines applies
when all of the limitations of a claim inhere in a prior composition or process. We
organized various cases on the basis of the outcome: if the court found that the
invention was not anticipated, the case was placed under the "Accidental
Anticipation" rubric; if the court found that the invention was anticipated, the case
was placed under the "Inherent Anticipation" rubric. After each case description,
potential tests (explicit and implicit) are distilled. The tests are then applied to each
discussed case to ascertain whether any of the tests apply to one doctrine but not the
other.
As a result of our analysis, we have developed a two-step test that can be used to
reconcile the two doctrines and determine whether a product or process anticipates.
The first question is whether the prior product or process was useful for any purpose.
If not, the process or product does not anticipate. If the product was useful, the
second question is whether the product was obtained or the process occurred under
unusual conditions. If the answer is yes, then the prior process or product does not
anticipate. We believe that this test helps resolve the confusion about inherent and
accidental anticipation while remaining consistent with Supreme Court, Federal
Circuit and CCPA decisions.

I. TESTS APPLIED BY COURTS

Courts have applied multiple tests in their anticipation analyses under varying
fact patterns. Prior to discussing the various tests and the current direction of the
Federal Circuit, a brief analysis of the cases and potential tests must be undertaken.
In the following sections, cases where a process was at issue are discussed first, and
then followed by cases dealing with compositions of matter. Each of these sections is
subdivided into accidental and inherent anticipation sections.

A.

Processes

1. AccidentalAnticipation

a. Tilghman v. Proctor
Tighman is the seminal case for accidental anticipation. The invention was a
process for producing free fatty acids by subjecting triglycerides to high heat and
pressure in the presence of water, which resulted in a glycerin backbone and
undamaged free fatty acids. 6 The defendants sought to invalidate the patent by
submitting evidence of the method's existence prior to the patentee's discovery.7 The
6Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 712-13 (1880).
7 Id. at 711-12.
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prior process was a method for lubricating a piston with fat in a steam engine.8
During operation of the steam engine, the process for producing free fatty acids was
accidentally performed because fat, containing triglycerides, was subjected to high
heat and pressure in the presence of water. 9 The defendants argued that free fatty
acids would necessarily be produced and the patent in question must be
anticipated. 10 The Supreme Court, however, found no anticipation.
In explaining why the prior existence of the process would not constitute
anticipation, the Court assumed, for the sake of argument, free fatty acids were
accidentally produced and the claimed process was accidentally performed in the
prior art.11 Notwithstanding the existence of the process, the Court reasoned that
the process did not anticipate:
We do not regard the accidental formation of fat acid in Perkin's steam
cylinder from the tallow introduced to lubricate the piston (if the scum
which rose on the water issuing from the injection pipe was fat acid) as of
any consequence in this inquiry. What the process was by which it was
generated or formed was never fully understood. Those engaged in the art
of making candles, or in any other art in which fat acids are desirable,
certainly never derived the least hint from this accidental phenomenon in
regard to any practicable process for manufacturing such acids.
• . . If the acids were accidentally and unwittingly produced, whilst the
operators were in pursuit of other and different results, without exciting
attention and without its even being known what was done or how it had
been done, it would be absurd to say that this was an anticipation of
12
Tilghman's discovery.
The following potential accidental anticipation tests are derived from Tighman:
(1) The claimed process was unintended in the prior art
(2) The claimed process was (assumed to be) a necessary consequence of an
intentional act
(3) The claimed process was unrecognized in the prior art
(4) The prior art had a different purpose
(5) The claimed process was not useful in the prior art

b. In re Marshall
In Marshall,the claims at issue were directed to a process for achieving weight
loss by periodically administering an anesthetic prior to eating so as to contact nerve

S -d. at 711.

9Id.
10Id. at 712.
11Id. at 711.
Id. at 711-12.

12

[4:63 2004]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

endings that release pancreatic hormones necessary for digestion. 13 The following
dependent claim is directed to the anesthetic oxethazaine: "A weight control process
14
as claimed in claim 2 wherein: said anesthetic means is oxethazaine."
The prior art was the Physician's Desk Reference, which prescribed oxethazaine
to treat colitis, ulcers and other gastro-intestinal problems by dosing periodically
prior to eating and at bedtime. 15 The court found no anticipation, reasoning as
follows: "Nothing in the PDR remotely suggests taking oxethazaine to lose weight. If
anyone ever lost weight by following the PDR teachings, it was an unrecognized
accident. An accidental or unwitting duplication of an invention cannot constitute an
16
anticipation."
The following potential accidental anticipation tests are distilled from
Marshalli
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

The
The
The
The
The
The

claimed process was intended in the prior art
result of the claimed process was unintended in the prior art
claimed process was recognized in the prior art
result of the claimed process was not recognized in the prior art
prior art had a different purpose
claimed process was useful in the prior art

However, it should be noted that Marshallwas cited only once by the Federal Circuit
in connection with an accidental anticipation analysis, and the court's reliance upon
17
Marshallis unclear.

c. MEHL/Biophile International Corp. v. Milgraum
The claims at issue in MEHL/Biophile were directed to a process for hair
removal by using a laser. The process destroys the papilla, the germ cells from which
hair grows, thus inhibiting further hair growth.18 The laser utilizes a wavelength
absorbed by melanin (found in melanosomes at the root of hair follicles) and an
exposure long enough to damage hair follicle papillae (where melanosomes are found)
but not the surrounding skin. 19 The sole independent claim provides:
A method of hair depilation, comprising the steps of:
a) aligning a laser light applicator substantially vertically over a hair
follicle opening, said applicator having an aperture of sufficient area to
surround a hair follicle and overlie its papilla;
13In re Marshall, 578 F.2d 301, 302-03 (C.C.P.A. 1978).

Id. at 302.
at 303.
16Id. at 304 (citing In re Felton, 484 F.2d 495, 500 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
17 In io Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
1s MEHL/Biophile Int'l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1363, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
14

15Id.

19 Id.
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b) applying through said aperture to the hair follicle a pulse of laser energy
of a wavelength which is readily absorbed by the melanin of the papilla and
having a radiant exposure dose of sufficient energy and duration to damage
its papilla so that hair regrowth is prevented and scarring of the
20
surrounding skin is avoided.
To prove anticipation, the defendants introduced a laser instruction manual
teaching tattoo removal. 21 Despite the defendants' argument that the manual
22
inherently disclosed the claimed process, the court found no anticipation.
The court stated that to anticipate, the reference would have to teach, either
expressly or inherently, aligning the laser "substantially vertically" over hair
follicles.2 3 The court continued, noting that it is possible, or even probable, that a
laser would be substantially vertically aligned over a hair follicle in the process of
removing a tattoo. 24 However, the court concluded if something happens only
occasionally it is not grounds for anticipation because "occasional results are not
25
inherent."
The following
MEHL/Biophile:
(i)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

The
The
The
The
The
The
The

potential

accidental

anticipation

tests

are

derived

from

claimed process occurred occasionally in the prior art
claimed process was intended in the prior art
result of the claimed process was unintended in the prior art
claimed process was recognized in the prior art
result of the claimed process was not recognized in the prior art
prior art had a different purpose
claimed process was useful in the prior art

2. InherentAnticipation

a. Verdegaal Brothers, Inc. v. Union Oil Company of California
In Verdegaal Brothers, the invention at issue was a process for making liquid
fertilizer from urea and sulfuric acid. 26 Claim 1 is representative:
In a process for making a concentrated liquid fertilizer by reacting sulfuric
acid and urea, to form an end product, the improvement comprising:

20 Id.
21

Id. A second reference asserted by the defendants is discussed in/ta Part I.A.2.b.

22 d. at 1365.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26

Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 630 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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(a) providing a non-reactive, nutritive heat sink, capable of dissipating the
heat of urea and sulfuric acid, in an amount at least 5% of the end product,
(b) adding water to the heat sink in an amount not greater than 15% of the
end product,
(c) adding urea to the mixture in an amount of at least 50% of the total
weight of the end product,
(d) adding concentrated sulfuric acid in an amount equal to at least 10% of
27
the total weight of the end product.
The prior art clearly disclosed elements (b)-(d) of the above claim, and added all the
components of (b)-(d) to previously reacted fertilizer in amounts that were inherently
at least 5% of the end product. 28 However, Verdegaal argued that the prior art did
not refer to, or recognize, the totally reacted fertilizer as a "heat sink" (element (a)).29
The prior art used the totally reacted fertilizer for convenience - so it would not have
to remove the old fertilizer - not to dissipate heat as the patentee suggested. 30 The
court found that the claims were anticipated, stating:
In essence, Verdegaal maintains that because [the prior art] did not
recognize the "inventive concept" that the heel functioned as a heat sink,
[the prior art's] process cannot anticipate. This argument is wrong as a
matter of fact and law....Even assuming [the prior art] did not recognize
that the heel of his process functioned as a heat sink, that property was
inherently possessed by the heel in his disclosed process, and, thus, his
31
process anticipates the claimed invention.
Verdegaal Brotherspresents the following potential inherent anticipation tests:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
the

A species of the claimed process was intended in the prior art
A species of the claimed process was recognized in the prior art
The prior art had the same purpose
The claimed process was useful in the prior art
A property of one of the components of the process was not recognized in
prior art

b. MEHL/Biophile International Corp. v. Milgraum
As discussed above, the claims at issue in MEHL/Biophile were directed to a
process for hair removal using a laser. The laser destroys the papilla, germ cells
from which hair grows, thus inhibiting further hair growth, but does not damage the
27 Id.
28 Id. at
29 Id.

632.

'30Id. The court relied on column 7 of the specification of the Stoller prior art patent, U.S.
Patent No. 4,315,763, beginning at line 30. Id.
'31 Id. at 633 (citing In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (C.C.P.A. 1981); In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d
210, 212-13 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
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surrounding skin. 32 The defendants presented a reference disclosing studies of laserinduced damage to melanosome cells in Guinea pig skin. 33 The reference described
using a laser to analyze the nature and extent of pigment cell injury and found that
melanosomes were a primary target. 34 Based on the reference, which included a
description of circular apertures resulting from laser pulses, the court stated, "the
record shows that holding the collimated laser in contact with the skin would align it
perpendicular to the skin surface and therefore substantially vertically over follicle
openings." 35 The court reasoned hair follicles are inherently exposed to perpendicular
36
application of the laser because Guinea pigs have so much hair.

Therefore, the prior art necessarily practiced the limitations of the claims
although it did not recognize the result, i.e., hair removal. The court took the
position that hair removal occurred inherently, thus, the reference anticipated the
37

claims.

The result was a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended

3
(melanosome destruction). 8

The following potential tests are derived from the inherent anticipation analysis
of MEHL/Biophie:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

The
The
The
The
The
The

claimed process was intended in the prior art
result of the claimed process was unintended in the prior art
claimed process was recognized in the prior art
result of the claimed process was not recognized in the prior art
prior art had a different purpose
claimed process was useful in the prior art

c. In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation
The claims at issue in Cruciferous Sprout were directed to a method for
preparing food rich in glucosinolates by germinating the seeds of specific crucifers
39
that when harvested before the two-leaf stage contain high levels of glucosinolates.
One of the claims reads, "A method of preparing a food product rich in glucosinolates,
comprising germinated cruciferous seeds, with the exception of cabbage, cress,
mustard and radish seeds, and harvesting sprouts prior to the 2-leaf stage, to form a
40
food product comprising a plurality of sprouts."

'32 MEHL/Biophile Int'l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also supra
Part I.A. 1.c.
'33 Id. at 1366.
34 Id. at 1364.
3

Id. at 1366.

36 Id.

Id. at 1367.
Id. at 1366-67.

'37

'38
3 In

re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation, 301 F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The food was used
to prevent cancer. Id.
40 Id.
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The prior art showed sprouts prepared from the claimed crucifers had been
eaten for years. 4 1 However, it did not recognize the presence of glucosinolates. 42 The
Federal Circuit noted the district court's explanation that "a plant (broccoli sprouts),
long well known in nature and cultivated and eaten by humans for decades, [cannot]
be patented merely on the basis of a recent realization that the plant has always had
some heretofore unknown but naturally occurring beneficial feature." 43 In finding
the claims inherently anticipated, the Federal Circuit stated, "[wihile [Plaintiff] may
have recognized something quite interesting about those sprouts, it simply has not
44
invented anything new."
The court further stated that all the sprouts identified in the patent were in the
public domain. 45 "The public remains free to make, use, or sell prior art compositions
or processes, regardless of whether or not they understand their complete makeup or
the underlying scientific principles which allow them to operate." 46 The court quoted
MEHL/Biophiie for the principle that "[i]nherency is not necessarily coterminous
with the knowledge of those of ordinary skill in the art... [and] artisans of ordinary
47
skill may not recognize the inherent characteristics or functioning of the prior art."
CruciferousSprout presents the following potential inherent anticipation tests:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

The
The
The
The
The

claimed process was intended in the prior art
claimed process was recognized in the prior art
claimed property was not recognized in the prior art
prior art had a different purpose
claimed process was useful in the prior art

B. Compositions ofMatter

1. AccidentalAnticipation

a. Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota and Ontario Paper Co.
The claims at issue in Eibel Process were directed to a machine for making
paper. 48 Claim one reads:
A Fourdrinier machine, having [the end of the mesh] maintained at a
substantial elevation above the level, whereby the stock is caused to travel

41

Id. at 1346.
id. at 1349-50.

2 See

43 Cruciferous Sprout,301 F.33d at 1351.

11Id. at 1346.
45
46

Id. at 1351.
Id. (quoting Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc., 190 F.33d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).

47 Crucife-rous Sprout,301 F.3d at 1349.
48 Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 46 (1923).
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by gravity, rapidly in the direction of movement of the wire, and at a speed
49
approximately equal to the speed of the wire, substantially as described.
In the paper making machine, a mesh material formed a continuous treadmill
around a set of rollers. 50 The wood-pulp slurry was fed at one end and moved along
the mesh. 51 Liquid drained through the mesh, and then the ultimate paper precursor
was delivered from the mesh rollers. 52 A problem with this process was that the
paper precursor material contained ripples when it came off the mesh. 53 The
patentees discovered that elevating the apparatus, such that the wire mesh was on
an incline, equalized the pulp gravity flow with the roller speed. 54 This adjustment
minimized ripples in the slurry. 55 The examples in the patent showed a substantial
56
elevation.
The prior art disclosed the same type of paper making machine having a
somewhat elevated mesh. 57 However, the mesh was elevated in the prior art to
improve drainage, not to minimize ripples. 58 The defendants pointed out that the
thickness of the pulp could vary. 59 Therefore, to achieve equal pulp flow and roller
60
speeds, the elevation would have to vary depending on the thickness of the pulp.
This meant that in some instances (e.g., thin pulp), achieving the desired results
61
required utilizing a slight elevation, such as that in the prior art.
The Court held the claims were not anticipated:
In administering the patent law the court first looks into
what the real merit of the alleged discovery or invention is
has advanced the art substantially... In the case before us,
we have already reviewed, we think that Eibel made
62
discovery, which has substantially advanced the art.

the art, to find
and whether it
for the reasons
a very useful

...[I]n the first place we find no evidence that any pitch of the wire, used
before Eibel, had brought about such a result as that sought by him, and in
the second place, if it had done so under unusual conditions, accidental
63
results, not intended and not appreciated, do not constitute anticipation.
From Eihel Process, the following potential tests are derived for accidental
anticipation:
49

Id. at 50.

M0
Id. at 47.
51 Id.
52 Id.
5

Id. at 52.

54 Id.
55 Id.

56 Id. at 49-50.
F7 Id. at 58.
58 Id.
F Id. at 59.
60 Id.
31Id.
62

Id. at 63.

(

Id. at 66 (citations omitted).
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(1) The claimed composition was intended in the prior art
(2) The result the composition could achieve was unintended in the prior
art
(3) The claimed composition was recognized in the prior art
(4) The result the composition could achieve was not recognized in the prior
art
(5) The prior art had a different purpose
(6) The claimed composition was useful in the prior art
(7) The composition of the prior art was an unusual embodiment of the
claimed invention

A. In re Seaborg
The claims at issue in Seaborg were directed to Element 95, now known as
Americium. 64 The inventors discovered this element and attempted to patent it.65
The art applied against the claims was the Fermi process for producing uranium in a
66
reactor, which inherently produces Americium.
The Federal Circuit held there was no anticipation. 67 The court agreed with
Appellant-Seaborg that the reactor could not have produced any more than "a
billionth of a gram [of Americium]," which "would have been distributed throughout
forty tons of intensively radioactive uranium reactor fuel." 68 As Seaborg successfully
argued, "this amount of an unknown unconcentrated isotope, if present, would have
69
been undetectable."
If the earlier disclosure offers no more than a starting point for further
experiments, if its teaching will sometimes succeed and sometimes fail, if it
does not inform the art without more how to practice the new invention, it
has not correspondingly enriched the store of common knowledge, and it is
70
not an anticipation.
Seaborgpresentsthe following potential accidental anticipation tests:
(1)
(2)
act
(3)
(4)
(5)

The claimed composition was unintended in the prior art
The claimed composition was a necessary consequence of an intentional
The claimed composition was not recognized in the prior art
The prior art had a different purpose
The claimed composition was not useful in the prior art

6 In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
6 Id.
66

Id. at 996-97.

67Id. at 999.
G8 Id. at

997.

69 Id.

70Id. (quoting Dewey & Almy Chem. Co. v. Mimex Co., 124 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir. 1942)).
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c. In re Felton
The invention in Felton was a dropper/stirrer combination for testing blood
samples.7 1 The dropper/stirrer was constructed so it would take-up and dispense
only one drop of liquid.72 It could then be turned around by the handler and used as
a stirrer.7 3 Accordingly, it was a cylindrical item with an opening at one end and a
flattened structure at the other end.7 4 The circumference of the opening could vary to
accommodate more or less viscous drops. 7 5 The prior art taught a medicine dispenser
for insertion into a body cavity with a basic cylindrical structure containing a
medicament, with one end sealed with wax and the other end flattened and scored to
76
break off so that medication could be dispensed.
The argument for invalidating the claim was that before the prior art medicine
dispenser was sealed with wax and prior to scoring, it had an open end and a
flattened end.7 7
Therefore, this intermediate would be the same as some
embodiments of the dropper/stirrer (for example, the dropper/stirrer used to dispense
a viscous liquid).78 In view of the purpose of the art, the prior art may have had an
79
intermediate with a dropper size similar to the dropper size of the patented device.
The court found no anticipation, stating:
[W]e do not disagree with the Board's apparent conclusion that an
intermediate structure made for the [prior art] could possess the
characteristics called for in these claims. However, in view of the purpose
for which the [prior art] was intended, it is apparent that it requires no
critical dimension which would lead to a structure inherently having those
characteristics. Therefore, it would be mere happenstance if any structure
made according to [the prior art] met the limitations of the claims. An
accidental or unwitting duplication of an invention cannot constitute an
80
anticipation.
From Felton, the following potential tests for accidental anticipation are derived:
(1)
(2)
art
(3)
(4)
art

The claimed composition was intended in the prior art
The result the composition could achieve was not intended in the prior
The claimed composition was recognized in the prior art
The result the composition could achieve was not recognized in the prior

71In re Felton, 484 F.2d 495, 497 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
72 Id.
73

Id. at 498.

74 Id. at 497.
7BId.
76 Id. at 498.
77 See id. at 500.
7s Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 499-500 (citing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880); Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. &
Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923)).
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(5) The
(6) The
(7) The
claimed

prior art had a different purpose
claimed composition was useful in the prior art
composition of the prior art was an unusual embodiment of the
invention

2. InherentAnticipation

a. Continental Can Co. U.S.A. v. Monsanto Co.

The claims at issue in Continental Can were directed to a container with several
specific features. Claim 1 is representative:
A container having a sidewall and a bottom structure closing the container
at an end portion of the sidewall,
the outer surface of the bottom structure comprising a central concavity, a
convex heel surrounding the concavity and merging therewith and with the
sidewall end portion, the lowermost points of the heel lying in a common
plane,
and a plurality of ribs interrupting the outer surface of the concavity and
distributed in a symmetrical array,
each rib extending longitudinally in the direction of the heel and
downwardly from an inner portion of the concavity, whereby the outer end
portion of each rib is lower than the inner portion thereof,
81
characterizedby the feature that the ribs are hollow

The limitation at issue is a bottom concavity of the container with an array of hollow
ribs around the concavity.8 2 The prior art taught the same limitation, except the ribs
were not disclosed to be hollow.8 3 However, one of the inventors of the prior art
testified that because the ribs were made by the process of injection blow molding,
84
they inherently would be hollow.
The Federal Circuit vacated the summary judgment of anticipation and
remanded so the district court could ascertain whether the ribs were hollow.8 5 There
was no decision on anticipation because of the factual
dispute about whether the
prior art process necessarily produced "hollow" ribs.8 6 Nevertheless, the Federal
Circuit noted that the reference would anticipate only if hollow ribs were necessarily
present and a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the ribs
87

were hollow.

81 Cont'l Can Co. U.S.A. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 124, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (emphasis
added).
82 Id. at 1267.
83 Id. at
M>Id.
85 Id. at
86 Id.
87 Id.

1268.
1269.
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To serve as an anticipation when the reference is silent about the asserted
inherent characteristic, such gap in the reference may be filled with
recourse to extrinsic evidence. Such evidence must make clear that the
missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in
the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary
skill.

88

Continental Can suggests the following potential tests for inherent anticipation:
(i) The claimed composition was intended in the prior art
(2) The prior art recognized the claimed composition
(3) The prior art had the same purpose
(4) The claimed composition was useful in the prior art
(5) The prior art may not have recognized a property of one of the
components

b. Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc.
The claims at issue in Atlas Powder are directed to a blasting composition with
various components:
A blasting composition consisting essentially of 10 to 40% by weight of a
greasy water-in-oil emulsion and 60 to 90% of a substantially undissolved
particulate solid oxidizer salt constituent, wherein the emulsion comprises
about 3 to 15% by weight of water, about 2 to 15% of oil, 70 to 90% of
powerful oxidizer salt comprising ammonium nitrate which may include
other powerful oxidizer salts, wherein the solid constituent comprises
ammonium nitrate and in which sufficient aeration is entrapped to enhance
sensitivity to a substantial degree, and wherein the emulsion component is
emulsified by inclusion of 0.1 to 5% by weight, based on the total
composition, of an [oil-in-water] water-in-oil emulsifier to hold the aqueous
content in the disperse or internal phase. 89
The limitation at issue is a composition with sufficient aeration (i.e., interstitial air)
entrapped to enhance sensitivity (detonability) to a substantial degree. 90
The prior art disclosed a blasting composition but did not recognize the presence
of interstitial air, instead, advising to eliminate it.91 However, there actually was
sufficient interstitial air to meet the claim limitation of the allegedly infringed
patent. 92 The court found the requirement of sufficient aeration was inherent in the
prior art because the compositions described necessarily contained a sufficient

88 Id. at 1268.
89 Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

0 d. at 1345.
91 Id.

92 Id. at 1346.
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amount of air.93 The court believed it was irrelevant that the prior art did not
recognize that air may act as the sole sensitizer of the explosive composition. 4 Thus,
the Federal Circuit held that the claims were anticipated. 95
In an extensive
discussion on the rules of inherency, the court noted:
Inherency is not necessarily coterminous with the knowledge of those of
ordinary skill in the art. Artisans of ordinary skill may not recognize the
inherent characteristics or functioning of the prior art. However, the
discovery of a previously unappreciated property of a prior art composition,
or of a scientific explanation for the prior art's functioning, does not render
96
the old composition patentably new to the discoverer.
The court analogized this case to Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner.97 There, the
invention was a titanium alloy containing various ranges of nickel, molybdenum, iron
98
and titanium, characterized by good corrosion resistance in hot brine environments.
99
The prior art reference disclosed the alloy but not the corrosion-resistant property.
The court affirmed that discovery of an inherent property of the alloy did not confer
novelty to the alloy. 100 In Atlas Powder, the court reached a similar conclusion,
maintaining the same reasoning would hold true when an ingredient, rather than a
property, is inherently contained in the prior art. 101 The court also noted:
The public remains free to make, use, or sell prior art compositions or
processes, regardless of whether or not they understand their complete
makeup or the underlying scientific principles which allow them to operate.
The doctrine of anticipation by inherency, among other doctrines, enforces
10 2
that basic principle.
From Atlas Powder, the following potential tests for inherent anticipation may
be derived:
(1) The claimed composition was intended in the prior art
(2) The claimed composition was recognized in the prior art
(3) The prior art had the same purpose
(4) The claimed composition was useful in the prior art
(5) The prior art did not recognize a property of one of the components of the
composition

9 Id. at 1345.
9 Id. at 1348.
9 Id. at 1349.
96 Id. at 1347 (citations omitted).
97 778 F.2d 775 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
98 Id. at 776.
9 Id. at 777.
100 Id. at 782.

101Atlas Powder, 190 F.3d at 1348.
Id.

102
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c. Elan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and
Research

i

OriginalOpinion, Later Vacated 0 3

In August 2002, the Federal Circuit issued an opinion by Judge Newman
regarding inherent anticipation that seemed to re-inject the requirement of
recognition of the allegedly anticipating compound or process by the prior art.104 This
105
decision was later vacated and a substitute opinion issued.
The Elan cases involved amyloid precursor proteins (APP), which are now
known to be broken down in the body into three fragments: a larger amino terminal
fragment (ATF-betaAPP), a smaller beta AP fragment, and the remainder of the
APP.106 Beta AP has been implicated in Alzheimer's Disease because it is found in
plaques in Alzheimer's patients. 10 7 The APP gene can have a mutation known as the
Swedish mutation, which affects the cleavability of the APP so that ATF-betaAPP is
formed.108
Elan's patents, U.S. Patent No. 5,612,486 (the '486 patent) and U.S. Patent No.
5,850,003 (the '003 patent), claimed a transgenic animal with human DNA
containing the Swedish mutation. 10 9 Claim 1 of the '486 patent was directed to a
transgenic rodent with the Swedish mutation where ATF-betaAPP is detectable in
brain homogenates:
A transgenic rodent comprising
a diploid genome comprising a transgene encoding a heterologous APP
polypeptide having the Swedish mutation wherein the amino acid residues
at positions corresponding to positions 595 and 596 in human APP695 are
asparagine and leucine, respectively,
wherein the transgene is expressed to produce a human APP polypeptide
having the Swedish mutation,
and wherein said polypeptide is processed to ATF-betaAPP in a sufficient
amount to be detectable in a brain homogenate of said transgenic rodent. 110
The prior art cited against the claims, U.S. Patent No. 5,455,169 (the '169
patent), suggested introducing a Swedish mutated human gene into a mouse. 1 The
inventors of the '169 patent did not reduce production of the transgenic mouse to

10:3Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 304 F.3d 1221 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (hereinafter Elan 1, vacated and reht granted, 314 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc),
substituted opinion, 346 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (hereinafter Elan Ifi.
104 Elan j 304 F.3d at 1230.
105 Elan -1 346 F.3d at 1051.
10
6 Elan , 304 F.3d at 1224.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 1226.
109 Id. at 1223.
110 Id. at 1226.
HI Id. at 1225.
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practice. 112 Furthermore, the '169 patent did not recognize the formation of ATF113
betaAPP.
Although the '169 patent does not mention the formation of ATF-betaApp, the
district court found formation was inherent in the suggestion of transgenic mice with
the Swedish mutation. 11 4 The Federal Circuit reversed and explained:
When anticipation is based on inherency of limitations not expressly
disclosed in the assertedly anticipating reference, it must be shown that the
undisclosed information was known to be present in the subject matter of
115
the reference.
Mayo argues, and the district court found, that this claim limitation is
"inherent" in [the prior art] because a successful transgenic procedure and
ensuing enzymatic cleavage will produce ATF-betaAPP. However, this was
not shown by [the prior art], and there was no evidence that the formation
and detection of ATF-betaAPP in the transgenic mouse brain with the
Swedish mutation was known to persons of ordinary skill in the field of the
invention. Inherency cannot be based on the knowledge of the inventor;
facts asserted to be inherent in the prior art must be shown by evidence
from the prior art. The purpose of the rule of inherency is to accommodate
common knowledge, knowledge that judges might not know but that would
116
be known to practitioners in the field.
Based on this reasoning, the Federal Circuit concluded that, because a person of
ordinary skill in the art would not have known that the ATF-betaAPP fragment
existed, the mere suggestion of a transgenic mouse, even if enabled and even if it
11 7
produced the metabolite in detectable amounts, would not anticipate.

ii. Substituted Opinion

18

On December 18, 2002, the Federal Circuit, acting en banc, vacated the prior
opinion without stating a reason.1 1 9 On October 2, 2003, the original panel issued
another opinion. This time, the court did not address the question of inherency, but
instead characterized the anticipatory reference as non-enabling:

113

at 1226, 1230.
Id. at 1227.

"

Id.

112Id.

11H5
Id. at 1228 (citing Cont'l Can Co. U.S.A. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir.

1991)).
116 Elan 1 304 F.3d at 1229 (citations omitted).
'7Id. at 1228-29.
1I8 Elan Pharms., Inc., v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 346 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir.

2003).
19 Elan Pharms., Inc., v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 314 F.3d 1299 (Fed.Cir.
2002) (en bane).
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In response to the questions raised in the petitions for reconsideration, we
clarify that invalidity based on anticipation requires that the assertedly
anticipating
disclosure
enabled
the
subject
matter
of
the
reference....Applying this rule, we remand for determination of whether the
120
[prior art] was an enabling disclosure.
Thus, the court appears to simplify the case to one in which enablement has not
121
been shown. The law is clear that to anticipate, the prior art must be enabling.
This reduces the matter to a clear issue: whether a prophetic invention is enabled.
Thus, a prophetic disclosure of an entire invention should be sufficient to establish
inherency. This was confirmed by the next case.
From Elan, the following potential inherent anticipation tests are derived:
(1)
(2)
act
(3)
(4)
(5)

The claimed composition was intended in the prior art
The claimed composition was a necessary consequence of an intended
An inherent property of the claimed composition was not recognized
The prior art had the same purpose
The claimed composition was useful

d. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Sbering is noteworthy for several reasons. It is the first case where the
doctrine of inherent anticipation was directly applied to the entire invention and not
just a characteristic, component, function, or property of a previously disclosed
invention. 122 Second, in its novelty analysis, Sbering removes the requirement that
a person of ordinary skill in the art recognize anything about the invention, including
its existence. 123 Third, the invention need not actually have occurred; it can be
125
prophetic. 124 Lastly, the invention can be the unknown result of a prior process.
Schering had two patents. The earlier patent, U.S. Patent No. 4,282,233 (the
'233 patent), is directed to the anti-histamine loratadine (ClaritinTM), and the later
patent, U.S. Patent No. 4,659,716 (the '716 patent), is directed to a metabolite of
loratadine, DCL (ClarinexTM).126 The defendants sought to produce generic
loratadine, as the '233 patent expired in 2001.127 Schering brought an infringement
suit for the '716 patent asserting the defendants induced infringement of the
metabolite that would be formed in vivo when loratadine is administered to a
patient.128

Elan , 346 F.3d at 1052.
Id. at 1054.
122 Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., 339 F.3d 1373, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
123 Id. at 1377.
121 Id. at 1380.
120

121

125

Id.

126

d. at 1374-76.
Id. at 1375-76.
Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d. 534, 539 (D.N.J. 2002).

127
128
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The earlier '233 patent did not expressly disclose DCL and did not refer to any
metabolite of loratadine. 129 Instead, it merely disclosed the administration of
loratadine. 130
Nevertheless, the defendants argued the '233 patent inherently
anticipated the '716 patent because DCL would inevitably be formed upon
administering loratadine. 3 1 Schering asserted that the claims to DCL were valid
because the existence of DCL was not recognized in the prior art. 132 In doing so,
133
Schering relied on the vacated Elan opinion.
The claims at issue in Sohering are directed to "[a] compound of the formula
[diagram of DCL] or pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof.... ,134 The district court
found inherent anticipation on the grounds that DCL was necessarily formed as a
metabolite by carrying out the process disclosed in the earlier patent, namely
disclosure to administer loratadine to a patient. 135 The Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court in an opinion by Judge Rader. 136
Judge Rader stated that inherent anticipation can apply to an entire
invention. 13 7 This solidifies the position in Elan. Previously, we discussed the fact
that accident cases were directed to the pre-existence of the product or process per se
(i.e., the entire claimed invention) while inherency cases were directed to pre-existing
parts, properties, results, etc., of the entire claimed invention. 138 We proposed that
this distinction may form a basis to distinguish accident from inherency. Sobering
completely changes the potential of this approach because Sohering is directed to the
inherent pre-existence of the entire invention.
In a detailed discussion, Judge Rader rejected the contention that inherent
anticipation requires recognition in the prior art:
Other precedents of this court have held that inherent anticipation does not
require that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time would have
recognized the inherent disclosure. E.g., In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig.,
301 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002); MEHL/Biophile Int'l Corp. v.
Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Where... the result is a
necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, it is of no import
that the article's authors did not recognize the results ."); Atlas Powder, 190
F.3d at 1348-49 ("Because 'sufficient aeration' was inherent in the prior art,
it is irrelevant that the prior art did not recognize the key aspect of the
invention... .An inherent structure, composition, or function is not
necessarily known."). Thus, recognition by a person of ordinary skill in the
art before the critical date of the '716 patent is not required to show
anticipation by inherency. The district court therefore did not err in

129 Schoring,339 F.3d at 1376.
1:30
Id.
131Schering,275 F. Supp. 2d. at 537.
1:32Schoring 339 F.3d at 1377.

Id.
131
Id. at 1375.
135 Schering 275 F. Supp. 2d at 542.
136 Schoring,339 F.3d at 1381.
1:7
Id.at 1380.
133

138

See supraINTRODUCTION.

[4:63 2004]

The Accidental and Inherent Anticipation Doctrines

allowing for later recognition of the inherent characteristics of the prior art
39
'233 patent.
The opinion also seems to implicitly take the position that recognition does not
distinguish accident from inherency, citing Eihel Process and Tighman for
support. 140 Eibel Proeess and Tlghman are distinguished on the grounds that the
prior art only possibly produced the claimed subject matter. 141 This is somewhat
misleading, however, since in those cases, certainty was not the dispositive issue.
Instead, the dispositive issue was that, even if the event had occurred, it was
unintended, unappreciated, not recognized, and not useful, and therefore, did not rise
142
to the level of legal anticipation.
The Sbering court quoted the following Eihel Proeess statement: "We find no
evidence that any pitch of the wire... had brought about such a result... and.. .if it had
done so under unusual conditions, accidental results, not intended and not
appreciated, did not constitute anticipation." 143 Thus, the court appeared to imply
that these elements still play a role in determining whether anticipation is accidental
by stating:
In the context of accidental anticipation, DCL is not formed accidentally or
under unusual conditions when loratadine is ingested. The record shows
that DCL necessarily and inevitably forms from loratadine under normal
conditions. DCL is a necessary consequence of administering loratadine to
patients. The record also shows that DCL provides a useful result, because
it serves as an active non-drowsy antihistamine. In sum, this court's
precedent does not require a skilled artisan to recognize the inherent
characteristic in the prior art that anticipates the claimed invention.144
Saying that DCL is "not formed accidentally" begs the question of how an
accident would be characterized. While Sehering did not elaborate on this issue, its
approval of Eibel Process and Tighman145 infers that an accident involves the
unusual, unintended, or unrecognized product or process.
The opinion also discussed Schering's contention that Continental Can stands
for the proposition that an inherent feature of a prior art reference must be perceived
as such by the person of ordinary skill in the art. 146 Judge Rader did not squarely
address the unequivocal proposition in Continental Can that a finding of inherency
requires the missing disclosure necessarily be present and recognized by a person of
ordinary skill in the art. 147 He concluded that "[u1n Continental Can, this court did
not require past recognition of the inherent feature, but only allowed recourse to
131)Sehering,339 F.3d at 1377.
110 Id. at 1378.
141 Id.
1 2 See supraParts I.A. l.a. & I.B.1.a.
143 Sehering, 339 F.3d at 1378 (quoting Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S.
45 (1923)).
1MSehering 339 F.3d at 1378.
145 Id.

116

Id. at 1377.

147

See supraPart I.B.2.a. (discussing of ContinentalCan).
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opinions of skilled artisans to determine the scope of the prior art reference." 148 This
interpretation appears inconsistent with Judge Newman's explicit statement in
149
Continental Can.
In addition, Sohering distinguished In re Seaborg on the grounds that the
isotope would have been produced at undetectable amounts, whereas DCL forms in
readily detectable amounts. 150 Judge Rader approvingly cited the following potential
test for anticipation: "Where the result is a necessary consequence of what was
deliberately intended, it is of no import that the authors of the prior art did not
151
appreciate the results."
The following potential tests for inherent anticipation are derived from Sohering:
(1)
(2)
act
(3)
(4)
(5)

The claimed composition was not intended in the prior art
The claimed composition was a necessary consequence of an intentional
The claimed composition was not recognized in the prior art
The prior art had the same purpose
The claimed composition was useful

C. Summary Chart
Courts have articulated various tests to rationalize the choice of inherent or
accidental anticipation.
To help in an analysis of which potential tests are
consistently dispositive, we have constructed a chart correlating the tests with the
cases. The vertical columns refer to accidental (A) and inherent (I) anticipation
cases. The horizontal rows refer to the following potential tests and the presence or
absence of them in each case:
(1) Was the claimed composition or process recognized in the prior art?
(2) Did the prior art recognize the claimed result of the process or claimed
function of the composition?
(3) Was the invention per se intended?
(4) Was the claimed invention a necessary consequence of an intentional
act?
(5) Was the claimed composition or process useful in the prior art?
(6)
Was the claimed process performed occasionally or under unusual
conditions in the prior art or was the claimed composition formed
occasionally or under unusual conditions?

Schering,339 F.3d at 1377.
19 Compare Schering 339 F.3d at 1377, with Contl Can, 948 F.2d at 1269.
150 Id. at 1379.
151Id. at 1377 (citing MEHL/Biophile Int'l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
1999)).
"1
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Case:

A

A

A

A

A

A

Tilghman

EielF
Process

Seaboig

Felton

Marsha]]

MEHL
(Tattooremoval
aspect)

(1) Recognition of Invention per se

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

(2) Recognition of Property of
Invention

N/A

No

N/A

No

No

No

(3) Invention per se intended

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

(4) Invention Necessary
Consequence of Intentional Act

Yes

N/A

Yes

N/A

N/A

N/A

(5) Invention Useful

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

(6) Invention Unusual/Occasional

N/D

Yes

N/D

Yes

N/D

Yes

I

I

Elan

Sehering

N/D = not discussed in opinion
I = Inherent Anticipation

N/A = not applicable
A = Accident

I

I

I

I

MEHL
Case:

Atlas
Powder

Verdegaal (Pigment Cruciferous
cell
Sprout
Brthers
damage
aspect)

(1) Recognition of Invention per se

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

(2) Recognition of Property of
Invention

No

No

No

No

No

N/A

(3) Invention per se intended

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

(4) Invention Necessary
Consequence of Intentional Act

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Yes

(5) Invention Useful

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

(6) Invention Unusual/Occasional

No

No

No

No

No

No

N/A = not applicable
A = Accident

N/D = not discussed in opinion
I = Inherent Anticipation
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1. Analyzing the Table
We analyzed each of the potential tests to determine whether any consistently
apply to accidental anticipation but not inherent anticipation, and vice versa. With
the possible exception of the "unusual/occasional results" test, we did not find any
one test sufficient to distinguish the two doctrines. However, a combination of two
specific tests, the "useful" and "unusual/occasional" tests, may provide a helpful
framework for deciding whether the facts of a case constitute accidental or inherent
anticipation.

a. Recognition ofInvention per se
The "prior art recognition of the claimed process or composition" test fails as an
across the board test for both accidental and inherent anticipation. In Scbering, DCL
was not recognized by the art, yet the court found inherent anticipation. On the other
hand, in Eibel Process, Felton, and MEHL (tattoo removal), allegedly anticipating
compositions or processes were recognized, yet found to be accidental. Therefore,
recognition alone (or lack of recognition) of the invention or a property thereof is not
dispositive.

b. Recognition of a Propertyof the Invention
Recognition of a property of an invention is negative in all the accident cases,
but is also negative in several inherency cases, such as MEHL and Cruciferous
Sprout. Similarly, in Elan I the prior art did not recognize the formation of ATFbetaAPP. It is possible for the prior art to inherently anticipate even if the prior art
does not recognize the claimed result of the process or the claimed function of the
composition.
Therefore, this parameter alone cannot distinguish accidental
anticipation from inherent anticipation.

c. Inventionper se Intended
The "prior art intention to make the claimed invention per se" test fails as an
across the board test for both accidental and inherent anticipation. In Scbering, DCL
was not intended, yet the court found inherent anticipation. On the other hand, in
Eibel Process, Felton, and MEHL (tattoo removal), even though allegedly
anticipating compositions or processes were intended, they were deemed accidental.
Therefore, intent to achieve the claimed process or product alone is not dispositive.

d. Invention Necessary Consequence oflntentionalAct
This test only applies to three cases, however, it is not dispositive to distinguish
between accidental and inherent anticipation. The fact patterns for Seaborg,
Tilgbman, and Schering all exemplify the situation where a claimed invention is a
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necessary consequence of an intentional act.
In Seaborg, the invention was
necessarily produced by the intentional application of the Fermi process. In
Ti'ghman, the claimed process was necessarily achieved during intentional
application of the lubrication process. In Sehering, DCL would have been produced
as a consequence of administration of loratadine.

e. Usefulness
For inherency, all of the processes or compositions in the cases examined were
considered useful. This test alone is not dispositive, however, because in three of the
accident cases, the compositions or processes were also useful. For example, the
Eibel Process prior art composition was useful, yet the Supreme Court found the
anticipation was accidental.
In a sense, neither Tiighman nor Seaborg represent a discrete doctrine of
"accidental anticipation." Had these cases been litigated today, they both could have
been decided strictly based on enablement (similar to Elan 11). To be enabled, the art
must teach how to make and use the invention. 152 The prior process in Tilghman and
the prior composition in Seaborgwere not useful; thus, they were not enabled. It is a
well-established rule that to anticipate, a product or process must be enabled. 153 On
this basis alone, there would be no anticipation.

f

Unusual/Occasional

This parameter was not discussed except in three of the accidental anticipation
cases. Where the occurrence of the claimed invention was unusual or occasional, the
anticipation was deemed accidental. 154 Therefore, this parameter, in some cases,
may be dispositive by itself. If the occurrence of the prior art process or composition
was not unusual or occasional, then the claimed process or composition should be
inherently anticipated.
If the occurrence was occasional or unusual, then
anticipation is accidental.
Courts have not specified which criteria are considered in deciding what
constitutes "unusual" or "occasional." At this point, the most useful approach would
be to extrapolate the fact patterns of Eibel Process,Felton, and MEHL to one's own
specific fact pattern.

g. Combination of the Tests
From the chart, it is evident that for all the inherency cases, the inventions were
useful. As mentioned above, this alone is not dispositive because the inventions were
also useful in four of the accident cases. However, where the invention was useful
Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 346 F.3d 1051, 1054 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
154 See supra Parts I.A.1.c., I.B.1.a. & I.B.1.c.
152

153
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and unusual or occasional, the court found accidental anticipation but not inherent
anticipation. Furthermore, none of the inherency cases are directed to an invention
that is unusual/occasional. Thus, when the parameter of usefulness is combined with
the parameter "unusual/occasional," a pattern emerges. Wherever a process or
composition is considered useful, but only occurs under unusual conditions or
occasionally, a court should find that the anticipation was accidental.
Therefore, we suggest a two-prong test. The first prong is concerned with
whether the prior process or composition was useful in the art. If the answer to the
first prong is no, then the anticipation is accidental; if the answer is yes, the second
prong is whether the process or composition occurred under unusual conditions or
occasionally. If the answer to the second prong is no, then the anticipation is
inherent; if the answer is yes, then the anticipation is accidental.

2. Summary of the Conclusions
Accordingly, the following conclusions can be drawn:
(1) Recognition of an entire invention or property of invention is not
dispositive.
(2) Intent to achieve the claimed product or process is not dispositive.
(3) If a prior composition or process is not useful, it will not inherently
anticipate.
(4) If a process occurs only occasionally or under unusual conditions, or if a
composition is formed only occasionally or under unusual conditions,
anticipation is accidental even if the process was intentionally performed or
the composition intentionally made, regardless of whether the process or
composition was recognized and whether the composition or process was
useful.

II. WHAT IS THE FUTURE FOR ACCIDENTAL ANTICIPATION? -ACCIDENTAL
INFRINGEMENT UNDER SMITHKLINEBEECHAM CORP. v APOTEX CORP.

Although this recent case discusses accidental and inherent anticipation only in
dicta, it is important because it suggests that even an undetectable and
unintentional amount of patented subject matter may result in infringement.

A. Facts
Plaintiff SmithKine accused Defendant Apotex of infringing its patent, U.S.
Patent No. 4,721,723 (the '723 patent), directed to a hemihydrous form of Paroxetine
hydrochloride ("PHC").155 PHC is an antidepressant originally patented in its
anhydrous form in the late 1970s. 156 In 1985, scientists at SmithKline created a new,
'55

SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

156 Id. at 1308.
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hemihydrous form of PHC, which was claimed in the '723 patent. 157 Claim 1 of the
'723 patent recites "[c]rystalline paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate.1 58
Starting in 1993, SmithKline marketed the PHC hemihydrate under the name
Paxil ®.159 In 1998, Apotex filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) to
market its generic version of PHC antidepressant. 160 In the ANDA, Apotex specified
that it would market an anhydrate form of PHC and, thus, not infringe the '723
patent.161 Nevertheless, SmithKline asserted that Apotex would infringe the '723
patent because Apotex would inevitably produce trace amounts of PHC hemihydrate
162
in the process of making PHC anhydrate.

B. Claim Construction & Infringement
The claims at issue were construed to cover trace or undetectable amounts of
hemihydrous

PHC. 163

In

arguing for infringement,

SmithKline

relied on the

"disappearing polymorph" theory. 164 According to this theory, once the hemihydrous
form of PHC was created, it contaminated the environment and resulted in the
conversion of the anhydrate to the more stable patented hemihydrate. 165 Because the
hemihydrate form is more stable, the anhydrate form converts to hemihydrate
through "seeding," making it no longer possible to produce uncontaminated
anhydrate. 166 Therefore, SmithKline argued that Apotex's tablets of anhydrous PHC
would inevitably contain at least trace amounts of hemihydrous PHC, which may be
undetectable. 167 Both the district court and the Federal Circuit found the record
supported SmithKline's theory.168

C. Anticipation
Having construed the claims to cover even the undetectable amounts of PHC
hemihydrate, the court turned to the anticipation analysis. 169 It found that while the
prior art (trace amounts of PHC hemihydrate) would have anticipated the '723 patent
had the prior art existed before the filing, it did not exist at that time. 170 Both the
district court and the Federal Circuit accepted SmithKline's theory that the
hemihydrate form did not exist before 1985.171 Therefore, a somewhat anomalous
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situation was created; while the prior art infringes now, it did not inherently
anticipate the '723 patent simply because it did not exist at that time.
This aspect of the Federal Circuit's analysis has far-ranging implications for the
doctrine of accidental anticipation. It has long been recognized that "that which
would literally infringe if later in time anticipates if earlier."17 2 Accordingly, because
even undetectable and unintended amounts of PHC hemihydrate infringe the '723
patent, it inescapably follows that undetectable and unintended PHC hemihydrate
would have anticipated the '723 patent.17 3 In other words, if it was known that the
hemihydrate form existed before the filing date of the '723 patent, it would have
anticipated. SmithKline was saved because Apotex could not prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the hemihydrate existed before the filing date of the '723
patent.
It is interesting to apply our proposed two-step test to this fact pattern,
assuming that undetectable hemihydrate existed before the filing date of the '723
patent. The first question is whether undetectable hemihydrate was useful for any
purpose. The answer must be "no" because hemihydrate was an unrecognized byproduct of the process of making PHC anhydrate. Our test, therefore, would end at
this point and would lead to a finding of no anticipation. In contrast, the logic of
SmithK]ine would lead to the opposite result. If there is an infringement by this
undetectable hemihydrate, it must anticipate if it existed earlier in time. Otherwise,
the patentee would be able to prevent the public from practicing prior art, which is
never true.
Additionally, it appears that under the SmithKline logic, In re Seaborg17 4 would
have been decided differently. As discussed earlier in this article, Seaborg's claims to
Americium were upheld despite the fact that some small and undetectable amounts
of Americium were inherently produced in the prior art as a by-product of a different
process. The C.C.P.A. stated that the undetectable isotope did not enrich "the store
of common knowledge" and was not an anticipation. However, if the SmitKbine
rationale is applied, practicing the prior art process of producing minuscule amounts
of Americium as a by-product would infringe the patent to Americium, and the
patent to Americium must be anticipated by these tiny undetected amounts of
Americium.

D. Conclusion
The discussion of anticipation in SmithKline is dictum. The Federal Circuit
ultimately relied on the "public use" bar of §102(b) to hold claim 1 of the '723 patent
invalid. 175 Moreover, it was not entirely clear from the record whether the
17 6
hemihydrate form of PHC existed before the filing date of the '723 patent.

172 Id. (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)).
17'SmithKline, 365 F.3d at 1315.
174 See supra Part I.B. 1.b.
175SmithKline, 365 F.3d at 1321.
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Therefore, the discussion of what would happen if the hemihydrate existed in the
prior art is not the basis of the court's holding and is dictum.
Nevertheless, based on the court's rationale, infringement by accident is still
infringement. Infringement and anticipation go hand in hand: if something infringes
if later in time, then it anticipates if earlier in time.1 77 Therefore, had trace or
undetectable amounts of the hemihydrate existed in the prior art, they should have
anticipated. On the other hand, it would appear that trace or undetectable amounts
of hemihydrate are useless. Thus, if the court's dicta ultimately become law, this is
the first instance where a useless prior composition would inherently anticipate.
Hence, the first prong of our test would fail to distinguish accident and inherency. In
that situation, the only remaining test would be the second prong, whether a prior
art process occurred under unusual conditions or a prior art composition was
obtained under unusual conditions.

III. CONCLUSION
As our analysis demonstrates, courts do not seem to apply consistent standards
when faced with accidental or inherent anticipation. Since Tilghman, most courts
recognize that even when a claimed composition or process was present in the prior
art, under certain circumstances, anticipation may have been accidental. The
difficulty lies in determining exactly what such circumstances are as different courts
stress different reasons for finding or not finding anticipation.
Having analyzed various accidental and inherent anticipation cases, we propose
a decision tree consisting of the following two questions:
(1) Was the allegedly anticipating prior art product or process useful; and
(2) Was the product obtained under unusual conditions or did the process
occur under unusual conditions?
If the answer to the first question is no, then the anticipation is accidental; if the
answer is yes, then the second question must be answered. If the answer to whether
the composition was formed or process occurred under unusual condition is yes, then
the anticipation is accidental; otherwise, it is inherent.
If the rationale of the recent Federal Circuit decision in SmithKline v. Apotex
becomes the law, it would appear to abolish the first prong of our test, i.e., whether
the prior composition or process was useful. Since that panel of the Federal Circuit
virtually eliminated the concept of accidental infringement, it would appear that
accidental anticipation is also virtually abolished. Remembering the axiom of patent
law that "that which infringes if later in time anticipates if earlier,"17 8 even if an
allegedly anticipating composition was a useless by-product, it may still anticipate.
It remains to be seen if the Federal Circuit extends the SmithKline analysis to
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accidental anticipation cases or if it limits it to the unusual SmithKline fact
179
pattern.

179Also worth noting is that the rationale in SmithKline seems to conflict with In re Seaborg
In Sohering, the court stated that In re Seaborg was distinguished because the by-product was
undetectable. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In
SmithKline, however, the conclusion appears to be that an undetectable contaminant can still
anticipate. See SmithKline, 365 F.3d at 1315 (implying that had the defendant "presentded] clear
and convincing evidence of inherent anticipation" at trial, the defendant's prior art product-which
was found to contain only trace amounts of the compound covered by the plaintiffs patent-may
have anticipated the claim at issue). In view of the above considerations, it appears that if the
SmithKline rationale becomes law, then the only remaining test for accidental anticipation would be
whether the prior composition or process was occasional or unusual, as exemplified by EibelProcess,
Felton, and MEHL (tattoo removal aspect).

